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Abstract 
We present evidence on the effects of aid transfers and their degree of volatility on 
economic growth and show that these effects can be categorised in relation to the 
allocation of foreign aid between productive and non-productive purposes. Using a 
stochastic endogenous growth model, we provide a theoretical rationalisation for our 
empirical evidence. Both the empirical and the theoretical analyses generate a pertinent 
conclusion: situations in which aid actually inhibits the recipient’s growth rate may 
appear if and only if aid is volatile. As a result, we conclude that it is only in conjunction 
with the presence of aid variability that aid allocation decisions determine whether aid 
hurts or promotes trend growth. 
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1   Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence on the interest of how foreign aid can affect 
economic growth – an issue that has preoccupied both academic economists and policy 
makers. This renewed interest has been translated in a substantial number of both theoretical 
and empirical analyses, seeking to promote our understanding of the conditions under which 
aid could be effective (in terms of long-run macroeconomic performance) for recipient 
economies.1  
   Empirically, aid effectiveness has been shown to depend crucially upon the characteristics 
of recipient countries – most notably on the degree of political and civil liberties (e.g., 
Svensson 1999), on the quality of policy making and institutions (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 
2000; Collier and Dollar 2002), and on climate-related factors (e.g., Dalgaard et al. 2004). At 
the theoretical level, authors have only recently began to analyse the long-term effects of 
foreign aid in the context of endogenous growth models. Obstfeld (1999) finds that foreign 
aid given in the form of lump-sum transfers (i.e., non-productive aid) does not affect steady-
state growth but increases the speed of convergence towards the balanced-growth path. 
Similar results, concerning this particular form of aid, are reached by Chatterjee et al. (2003). 
They argue, however, that when aid is tied to public investment projects (i.e., productive aid) 
then it is likely to stimulate steady-state growth. In a similar vein, Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis 
(2007) argue that foreign aid can boost the recipient’s growth rate if it is used to co-finance 
the formation of public capital. Finally, by including elastic labour supply Chatterjee and 
Turnovsky (2007) find that non-productive aid has adverse effects on economic growth as it 
distorts the labor-leisure choice in such a way that induces agents to reduce their work 
effort.2    
   All the above analyses share a common feature – mainly, their silence on the issue of 
variability in foreign aid transfers and the implications that may arise from it, despite the fact 
that recent empirical studies (e.g., Pallage and Robe 2001; Buliř and Hamann 2003, 2006) 
                                                 
1 See World Bank (1998) and Easterly (2003) for an overview of the issue. 
2 Other theoretical analyses link foreign aid with the macroeconomic environment without focusing on the 
issue of long-run growth. Boone (1996) argues that, depending on the prevailing political regime, foreign aid 
can induce the government to either reduce domestic taxation or increase lump-sum transfers. Asiedu and 
Villamil (2002) show how different kinds of foreign assistance may alleviate the underinvestment problem that 
arises when the enforcement of debt contracts in international financial markets is imperfect.     
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have documented that aid is highly volatile.3 This volatility may be an additional and 
important factor determining the success of foreign aid in improving the growth rates of 
recipient economies and, consequently, increasing the prospect of higher levels of 
development.4 Indeed, this may be a particularly significant consideration, in light of recent 
stochastic, dynamic general equilibrium models (e.g., Blackburn and Galindev 2003) and 
empirical analyses (e.g., Ramey and Ramey 1995), that show how and for what reasons can 
different kinds of variability affect long-run growth.     
   The present analysis is concerned with highlighting the additional repercussions emerging 
for the foreign aid-economic growth nexus when variability in foreign assistance is taken 
under consideration – an issue that, so far, has eluded the attention of researchers. The 
novelty of our approach on examining the growth effects of foreign aid lies on explicitly 
taking account of both the volatility on the provision of foreign financial assistance and on 
considering the allocation of aid transfers between productive and non-productive uses.  
   We begin with an empirical analysis in which we utilise a panel that covers up to 66 aid-
recipient countries over the sample period from 1973 to 1998 and consider one eight-year 
and two nine-year period time intervals that correspond to three different decades. Since our 
aim is to distinguish the growth effects of the productive and unproductive components of 
aid and of their respective volatilities, we obtain their proxies by adopting the classification 
methodology of Clemens et al. (2004). By considering the heterogeneity of aid, both at its 
levels and at its degree of instability, we find that aid disbursements used for productive 
purposes have a positive effect on growth, while unproductive use of them decreases 
growth. In contrast, the volatility of productive aid is found to hurt growth, while the 
variability of unproductive aid is associated with higher growth. These results are found to 
be robust to a wide range of sensitivity tests, including different estimation techniques and 
period averaging. 
   The next step is to provide a possible theoretical justification for our empirical results. The 
theoretical framework we employ is described by an analytically-tractable, stochastic growth 
model in which the accumulation of – both private and public – capital provides the 
underlying source of endogenous, sustainable growth (e.g., Futagami et al. 1993). In this 
                                                 
3 For instance, Pallage and Robe (2001) report an average volatility of aid inflows of about 25% in African 
recipients and 29.5% in non-African recipients.  
4 Pallage and Robe (2001) make this clear with their statement that “…if one is interested in the welfare or the 
growth of recipient countries, one cannot not be interested in the pattern of disbursements.” 
 4
environment, the government receives an inflow of foreign transfers which then allocates 
between productive (i.e., formation of public capital) and non-productive (i.e., lump-sum 
income transfers) uses. However, these transfers are not stable through time. Instead, they 
are characterised by some degree of variability. The dynamic process for private capital 
depends on the resources the individuals devote for this purpose, while that of public capital 
may depend on both domestic financing (through tax revenues) and on external financing 
(through aid receipts). As it turns out, our model can produce a theoretical rationale for our 
empirical results. As it will become clear in the main text, the optimal response of the private 
sector’s capital investment plays a crucial role in generating these effects.  
   Moreover, both the empirical analysis and the theoretical model generate an additional but 
even more important result that introduces a new dimension on the interactions between aid 
receipts and growth performance: The possibility that foreign aid inhibits the growth rate of 
the recipient emerges only when aid disbursements are volatile. Consequently, the presence 
of aid variability is the key factor in rendering the allocation of foreign aid among different 
uses as an important determinant of its effectiveness.   
   The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the empirical 
methodology and describe the data. In section 3 we present our basic results and conduct 
the robustness testing. Section 4 lays out the theoretical framework and derives the results 
concerning the impact of foreign aid, and its volatility, on the rate of output growth. Section 
5 concludes.             
 
2   Methodology and Data 
Our aim is to examine the growth effects of aid transfers as a function of the behaviour of 
both the donor and recipient countries. We do this by jointly considering the allocation of 
aid flows by recipients into productive and unproductive uses and the time profile of their 
respective distribution by donors. Although the notions that different types of aid may have 
different effects on growth and that the volatility of aid may affect growth are by no means 
novel, they have only been examined independently of each other.5 In this and the next 
                                                 
5 The aid disaggregation issue has been empirically studied, among others, by Clemens et al. (2004), Gomanee et 
al. (2005), and Reddy and Minoiu (2006), while aid volatility has been examined by Lensink and Morrissey 
(2000), Pallage and Robe (2001),  Buliř and Hamann (2003, 2006), Fielding and Mavrotas (2005), and Prati and 
Tressel (2006). 
 5
section we offer an empirical investigation that combines these two strands of the literature, 
which is then followed by a suggestive theoretical explanatory analysis of the findings. 
 
2.1   Methodology 
To test the effect of aid and its respective volatility on economic growth, first we need to 
classify the use of aid flows by the recipient government into productive and unproductive. 
This classification is based on Clemens et al. (2004), who disaggregate aid flows into three 
types – short-impact aid, long-impact aid, and humanitarian aid. According to the authors, all 
aid is not alike and therefore all types of aid should not be expected to affect economic 
growth in a similar manner. In other words, there are categories of aid flows that are 
expected to enhance growth within a short period of time of four to five years (i.e., aid used 
for infrastructure, industry, trade, services, and budgetary support purposes), others that 
work with a long time lag (i.e., financing health, education, and social infrastructure 
programmes), and others that may even have a negative association with growth (i.e., 
emergency food aid and reconstruction relief during and after natural disasters). 
   In what amounts to our goal, we do not need to make a distinction between short- and 
long-impact aid as long as we accommodate the element of time. This means that since both 
types of aid are expected to have a positive impact on growth, albeit with a different time lag, 
we jointly consider them as productive and adjust the time period averages of study to nine-
year intervals. In this way, we manage to strike a balance between the shorter period 
appropriate to capture the growth effects of short-impact aid and a longer period which is 
likely to capture the effects of long-impact aid. In addition, this periodization may be more 
appropriate in assessing the impact of aid volatility on growth compared to a much shorter 
interval.6  
   Following Clemens et al. (2004) and using the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS), 
which reports aid commitments by purpose, the Appendix Table A1 describes the 
classification of aid flows into the categories under consideration. In addition, Table A2 
presents the methodology that has been followed in order to obtain estimates of productive 
and unproductive aid flows. This requires the use of the OECD’s Development Assistance 
                                                 
6 Although we consider the nine-year average specification as our benchmark, we also examine the potentially 
different effects of productive versus unproductive aid on growth by considering alternative periodization 
(four-year intervals) and a higher level of disaggregation to short- and long-impact aid. 
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Committee (DAC) database, which includes data on total ODA (Official Development 
Assistance) gross disbursements.7 
   We test our main hypothesis by employing the following model specification:  
 , ,
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where itg  denotes the average rate of growth of per capita GDP in country i  at time t , 
P
itα  
represents gross disbursements of productive aid (% of GDP), Uitα  is gross disbursements of 
unproductive aid (% of GDP), itr  is gross repayments on aid (% of GDP), and 
j
itV  is a 
vector of the volatilities of the two types of aid disbursements measured as the standard 
deviation of the respective aid type within each time interval.8, 9 ,k itX  is a vector of variables 
that have been identified in previous studies to explain a substantial variation in the data. 
These are the logarithm of initial income, M2-to-GDP as a proxy for the development of the 
financial system (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000), the fertility rate, the fraction of land in the 
tropics indicating the idiosyncrasy of these locations (e.g., Dalgaard et al. 2004; Clemens et al. 
2004), and the log of initial life expectancy as a proxy for health conditions (e.g., Clemens et 
al. 2004; Rajan and Subramanian 2005). Finally, ,l itD  are the dummies controlling for 
regional differences (Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia). In addition, all regressions account 
for common deterministic trends by incorporating dummies for the different time periods.  
                                                 
7 As made clear in Clemens et al. (2004), the reason we construct our productive and unproductive aid proxies 
by using the CRS disaggregated aid commitments instead of the DAC disaggregated aid disbursements is the lack of 
data of the latter database prior to 1990. Our measures imply that the fraction of disbursements in the two aid 
categories in a given period is equal to the fraction of commitments in each category in that period. This is not 
an unrealistic assumption as shown in the analysis conducted by Clemens et al. (2004). 
8 As shown in Table A2, the identity that determines gross repayments on aid is .it
net
it
gross
it r+= αα  The decision 
to use in our specification gross aid disbursements and gross aid repayments instead of net aid disbursements, 
is based on the consideration that aid repayments possibly have a different association with growth than aid 
disbursements. That is, we prefer to test for it rather than impose it. As in Clemens et al. (2004), aid repayments 
are assumed to have a non-linear effect, justifying the use of the log operator. 
9 The standard deviation of a variable is commonly used as a measure of its volatility. See, among others, 
Ramey and Ramey (1995) for a study that calculates the volatility of output. The choice to use the standard 
deviation of each respective type of aid as a fraction of GDP instead, say, of aid in absolute terms, or aid per 
capita, is based on two considerations. First, as stated in Buliř and Hamann (2006) although the “denominator 
matters more for the statistical measures of relative volatility than the definition of aid (…), if the objective is to 
assess the macroeconomic impact of aid, the relevant denominator is the aid-to-GDP ratio.” Second, for 
consistency, since other studies that deal with the volatility of aid utilize its measurement through the aid-to-
GDP ratio (i.e., Lensink and Morrissey 2000; Fielding and Mavrotas 2005; Prati and Tressel 2006). 
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   A positive value of Pβ  and a negative value of Uβ  would indicate the importance of the 
disaggregation of aid flows when examining the aid-growth relationship. It would also 
provide a partial explanation to the results of the studies that find an insignificant effect of 
aid on growth when using aggregate measures. In addition, a negative value of Pδ  and a 
positive value of Uδ  would illustrate the significance of the disaggregation of aid flows with 
respect to the time profile of their disbursements. This would also highlight the contrasting 
effects of the different types of aid and of their volatilities on growth. 
   Our benchmark model specification in equation [1] is originally estimated with OLS, and 
then with two methods that account for possible endogeneity of the regressors. These are a 
standard static GMM estimation and its dynamic equivalent developed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998). The instruments we use for the first technique include once lagged values of the 
potentially endogenous variables and exogenous variables drawn from Hansen and Tarp 
(2001) and Clemens et al. (2004). These are a dummy for Central American countries, a 
dummy for the African Franc Zone countries, a dummy for Egypt, time period dummies 
indicating one and two periods after the elapse of a civil war, once lagged arms imports 
relative to total imports, per capita GDP and its square, population and its square, and infant 
mortality rate and its square.10 The second method of system GMM treats the model as a 
system of equations, in first-differences and in levels, where the endogenous variables are 
instrumented with lags of their levels and of their first differences. 
   In using the above instrumental variable approaches to examine our main hypothesis, we 
apply three specification tests to ensure the robustness of our results. First, we test the 
validity of the instruments with Hansen’s J-statistic of over-identifying restrictions.11 Second, 
we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) test to examine all of our regressions for first and 
second order degrees of serial correlation in the error terms. Because first-order serial 
correlation is identified in some of the regressions, we use clustered standard errors by 
country throughout making them robust to serial correlation.12 Finally, we restrict the 
                                                 
10 To minimize the possible estimation bias created by the exogenous set of instruments, we exclude variables 
that may be directly related to growth in the recipient country (i.e., policy and its lags; see Rajan and 
Subramanian (2005) for more details). 
11 Hansen’s J-test is preferred over the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, since, unlike the latter, it is 
consistent in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Roodman 2004). 
12 For the system GMM, however, since first-differencing induces first-order serial correlation in the 
transformed errors, the appropriate check regards only the absence of second-order serial correlation. 
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number of instruments to be less than the number of countries since otherwise the over-
fitting of the instrumented variables may bias the results towards the OLS estimates. 
 
2.2   Data 
Our data set comprises panel data for 66 aid recipient countries over the period 1973-1998.13 
Most of the data are drawn from three different sources. The data on aid come from the 
OECD’s DAC and CRS databases, while most of the rest of the data are from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. Details on the description and the sources of the variables 
can be found in the Appendix, Table A2. Although the data are based on annual 
observations, we remove the effects of the business cycle and extract the relevant long-run 
information by taking averages that correspond to each of the three decades (one eight-year 
and two nine-year time intervals: 1973-80, 1981-89, 1990-98). This standard approach in the 
growth literature allows an easy comparison with previous studies and also ensures 
compatibility with the theoretical analysis in section 4 that focuses on the effects of aid on 
trend growth.  
   Summary statistics for the data set can be found in Table 1. It is interesting to note that by 
our classification productive aid represents roughly 87% of all aid flows, while its volatility 
exceeds that of unproductive aid by a scale of three. At a higher level of disaggregation, 
short-impact aid constitutes about 55% of total aid flows and its volatility is greater than that 
of long-impact aid by about 50%. This preliminary statistics, therefore, indicate that although 
the productive types of aid comprise the largest share of total aid transfers, they also 
represent the most unstable ones. 
  
3   Empirical Findings 
This section conducts the estimation analysis and reports the results of the relationship 
between the different uses of aid receipts, their volatility, and economic growth. First, we 
present the basic findings and then we undertake a wide range of tests to examine their 
robustness for different specifications, time periodizations, more detailed disaggregations, 
and possible income threshold effects. 
 
                                                 
13 The countries involved are listed in the Appendix. 
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3.1   Basic Results 
Table 2 summarizes the basic findings. Originally we estimate a simpler version of equation 
[1] with OLS where we use aggregate measures of gross aid and its volatility.  Subsequently 
we incorporate the disaggregated measures of aid and more control variables included in the 
vectors ,k itX  and ,l itD . Thereafter, as we move to the right of Table 2 we progressively 
allow more regressors to be endogenous.  
   The first column depicts the homogeneous effects of aid and aid volatility on growth, thus 
verifying the result first illustrated by Lensink and Morrissey (2000) – mainly, that aid 
significantly influences growth in a positive way while the volatility of aid inhibits growth.14 
Column (2) allows the empirical link between aid, aid volatility, and growth to vary 
depending on the use of aid by the recipient governments. These heterogeneous effects are 
captured by the disaggregation of aid into its productive and unproductive counterparts. The 
results exhibit a reasonably good fit, with the estimated effects of the two types of aid and 
their volatilities being strongly significant and entirely contrasting in nature. In particular, we 
find that aid disbursements used for productive purposes have a positive effect on growth, 
while the unproductive use of them reduces growth. Contrary, the volatility of aid is found 
to hurt growth only when aid is used productively, while the volatility of unproductive aid 
disbursements is associated with higher growth. 
   Column (3) adds the remaining conditioning variables described in equation [1]. The 
influence these variables exert on economic growth are in accordance to economic theory 
and the findings of past studies. Specifically, being situated in East Asia and having a more 
developed financial system are related with higher growth rates, while higher fertility rates 
adversely affect growth. We also find that although being situated in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
having a higher fraction of land in the tropics, and a higher initial GDP per capita (a higher 
initial life expectancy) are associated with slower (higher) growth, are not so to a statistically 
significant degree. Turning our attention to the variables of interest, we find that their signs 
have remained intact, and that all of them have increased in absolute magnitude, now being 
strongly significant at the 1% level. 
                                                 
14 Pallage and Robe (2001) have raised a similar argument regarding the volatility of aid. They find the pattern 
of aid disbursements to be highly procyclical. This, by intensifying the volatility of output, may result in lower 
growth. 
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  One possible drawback of the results presented thus far is that they may be biased by the 
endogeneity of some of the regressors. To overcome such a problem, we estimate the 
growth equation with GMM, where the instrumented variables are limited to the aid 
variables in column (4) and expanded to initial income and M2/GDP in column (5). These 
appear in bold type. 
   Column (4) shows that controlling for endogeneity improves the fit of the regression 
without altering the results. All the coefficients are similar in magnitude and significance, the 
only exception being the emergence of income convergence effects. Regression (5) utilizes 
an instrumental estimation approach that has been deemed to be superior to static GMM, 
the system GMM. This method accommodates all the variables that are considered to be 
endogenous and controls for them with their lagged levels as instruments. The results of this 
procedure continue to strongly support our underlying conclusions. 
   The specification tests in Table 2 as expressed by the Arellano-Bond (1991) test, although 
fails to reject the hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation in the error term just for 
regression (3), it fails to reject the hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation in all 
regressions at the 5% level. Additionally, Hansen’s (1982) J statistic, which examines the 
validity of the instruments in columns (4) and (5), cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term at the 5% level. The one-sided Wald-test 
that appears in the last row of the table examines the overall contribution of aid on growth 
by considering the sum of the coefficients of the two types of aid and their respective 
volatilities. As can be seen, the null hypothesis that this sum is negative cannot be rejected at 
any acceptable level of significance. This implies that when the volatility of aid is taken into 
account, the total effect of foreign aid on the recipient’s rate of growth is negative. This is an 
issue that we will return again at the theoretical section of the paper. 
   The final point to note from our benchmark findings in Table 2 is that the coefficients in 
our variables of interest are fairly stable along the different regressions considering, in 
particular, the use of a variety of estimation techniques and number of instruments. The aim 
of the following sub-sections is to investigate the robustness of our findings in a more 
detailed manner. 
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3.2   Robustness Tests 
Until recently, very few studies exploring the impact of aid on growth have examined the 
broader applicability of their results by means of robustness testing. However, the studies of 
Easterly (2003) and Roodman (2004) have demonstrated that most of the recent empirical 
results are susceptible to changes in specification, alternative periodizations, definition of 
variables, dataset expansion, and influential observations. To account for such 
considerations, we investigate in this section the sensitivity of our results to a number of 
alterations along these proposed lines. Our basic findings survive all these tests and clearly 
indicate the importance of considering jointly the disaggregation of aid flows by purpose and 
the pattern of their distribution in exploring the effectiveness of foreign aid on growth. 
 
3.2.1   Testing the specification 
Although the variables included in vector ,k itX  identify regressors that have been found 
relevant in the growth literature, the set is by no means comprehensive. To this extent, we 
examine the sensitivity of our findings by expanding vector ,k itX  with a number of 
additional control variables. These include secondary school enrolment (e.g., Barro and Sala-
i-Martin 1995), land area (e.g., Radelet et al. 2001), black market premium (e.g., Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin 1995), and indicators of domestic policy and institutional quality as captured by 
the budget balance (fiscal), inflation (monetary), the Sachs-Warner index (openness), and the 
ICRGE index (institutions) (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000; Dalgaard et al. 2004; Clemens et 
al. 2004). Additionally, since the time horizon of nine years we consider is long enough for 
reverse causality to emerge running from growth to the policy and institutional indicators, 
we instrument them in our GMM framework. 
   The results appear in Table 3, where controlling for these additional factors and 
considering their potential endogeneity does not alter our conclusions in any way. The aid-
related coefficients have the appropriate sign and are significant at least at the 5% level. All 
the additional controls have the expected sign, with the policy and institutional regressors 
significantly affecting economic growth.15  
                                                 
15 We considered using as our benchmark specification one with all the indicators of domestic policy and 
institutional quality since they were all found to be significant at the 5% level. However, since this led to a loss 
of about a third of the observations, we use this specification as a robustness check of the basic findings. 
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   The last regression of the table considers a restricted specification of the model where the 
volatility measures are set to have a zero coefficient ( 0)P Uδ δ= = . In this way, we can 
isolate the effects of productive and unproductive aid on growth when their disbursements 
are assumed not to impact growth. We observe that in the special case where the time profile 
of aid transfers is not allowed to play any role with respect to growth, then productive aid is 
conducive to growth while unproductive aid has no effect on growth. These results are 
consistent with recent studies that focus on different types of aid but ignore the relevance of 
their variability with respect to growth (e.g., Reddy and Minoiu 2006). Finally, note that the 
Hansen’s J-statistic confirms the validity of the instrument set at the 5% level for all the 
regressions in the table. 
 
3.2.2   Testing the periodization 
It has become a standard procedure in cross-country growth regressions to use time period 
averages to capture the long-run effects of the conditioning variables on economic growth. 
In the aid-growth literature, almost all of the studies use either four-year or five-year periods, 
with the exception of Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), who use twelve-year averages. 
Recently, however, Easterly (2003) and Roodman (2004) have shown that different 
periodizations can significantly alter the results of the most prominent empirical studies (e.g., 
Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Collier and Dollar 2002). To encounter 
such an issue in this study, we consider the most commonly used alternative time period 
average of four-year intervals.  
   Table 4 reports results based on both static and dynamic GMM estimations for our basic 
specification as illustrated in equation [1]. Columns (1) and (3) reproduce the benchmark 
nine-year average regressions from Table 2 to ease comparison. Columns (2) and (4), based 
on four-year averages, show that our results remain materially unaffected by altering the 
periodization of the regression implying that decreasing the period averaging does not affect 
neither the magnitude nor the statistical power of the estimated coefficients of concern. 
This, in turn, seems to imply, once more, the importance of using disaggregated aid flows in 
growth regressions, rather than using an aggregate measure with substantial noise that 
creates difficulties in attributing its impact. 
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3.2.3   Testing the proxy of productive aid 
In the preceding analysis, by summing over all the types of aid that are considered to be 
productive, we have implicitly assumed that all the categories of productive aid (and their 
variability) have the same impact on economic growth. An interesting exercise, therefore, 
would be to examine the potentially different effect of productive aid by disentangling short-
impact from long-impact aid in the spirit of Clemens et al. (2004). In this way, we can 
investigate whether the results regarding productive aid are driven by one of its components. 
In addition, we can provide a check to Clemens et al.’s (2004) findings, who unveil that 
short-impact aid’s marginal growth effect largely reflects its impact within a nine year period. 
Since we utilize nine-year average intervals, our estimations can provide a natural benchmark 
to test their conclusions. 
   For this purpose, we disaggregate productive aid into its short- and long-impact 
counterparts and include them along with their volatilities in our regression specification.16 
Table 5 reports the results. Column (1) depicts that short-impact aid is the only component 
of productive aid that retains its positive effect on growth, while its volatility is strongly 
negatively significant. Long-impact aid, on the other hand, is no longer significant, while its 
volatility is significant only at the 10% level. The results regarding humanitarian aid are 
(unsurprisingly) the same as for unproductive aid. These results clearly show that the 
relevant component of productive aid for growth within a nine-year period is short-impact 
aid, thereby providing support to Clemens et al. (2004). 
   Comparing the magnitude of the short-impact aid coefficients with the ones in Table 2, 
column (4) that uses productive aid, we observe greater estimates for both short-impact aid 
related regressors by roughly 50%, indicating the downward bias in the coefficients induced 
by the uniform treatment of short- and long-impact aid as equally productive. This becomes 
even more transparent in column (2), where we restrict the coefficients of long-impact aid 
and its volatility to zero. The coefficients of both short-impact aid and its volatility increase 
and their p-values fall to zero, suggesting that the standard errors in column (1) were inflated 
by the collinearity of short- and long-impact aid.  
   In columns (3) and (4) we conduct a robustness check where we add policy and 
institutional variables for which we instrument. Now, in column (3) both the coefficients 
                                                 
16 The description and calculation of these variables can be found in the Appendix, Table A1 and A2. In 
addition, Table 1 presents their summary statistics. 
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related to long-impact aid are insignificant and the volatility of humanitarian aid becomes 
significant at the 10% level. However, dropping the insignificant variables establishes the 
significance of all the remaining variables of interest at least at the 5% level. Finally, column 
(5) excludes the volatility measures of short-impact and humanitarian aid to examine the 
effects of their mean values on growth, assuming that volatility does not matter for growth. 
The results suggest a positive effect of short-impact aid and a zero effect of humanitarian aid 
on growth, consistent with the finding in Table 3, column (7). Again, however, we observe 
an upward movement in the estimated coefficient, which more than doubles, and a drop in 
the p-value that constitutes the variable significant even at the 1% level.  
   Although, the last set of results illustrate that short-impact aid is a more accurate measure 
of aid that is conducive to growth than what we coined “productive” aid, our results in the 
previous sections are still of significance since they manage to capture the growth effect of 
productive aid despite the downward bias induced in the coefficients. With that view, our 
benchmark estimates can be thought of as representing the lower bound on the true 
coefficient of productive aid. 
 
3.2.4   Testing income threshold effects 
The final test we undertake is to re-examine the basic results for a sub-sample of low-income 
and lower-middle income countries, based on the fact that the country sample we use cannot 
be regarded as a homogeneous country grouping. Therefore, it is possible the effect of aid 
on growth to differ in magnitude and significance. From a theoretical point, such a view is 
supported by poverty trap models that advocate in favour of aid transfers as a stimulating 
mechanism for domestic savings and investment that will eventually place these countries to 
a sustained path of economic growth (e.g., Sachs et al. 2004). 
   Typically, income threshold effects are investigated with the use of interaction terms 
between the regressors of concern and income group dummy variables. However, since the 
majority of the countries in our sample fall into the low-income category in order to avoid a 
correlation problem between the aid variables and their interaction terms with income 
dummies, we choose to report findings from our benchmark model specification that is 
restricted to low income countries. Results appear in Table 6, where in columns (1) and (2) 
we run our standard regression that includes productive and unproductive aid in static and 
dynamic specifications respectively. Similarly, columns (3) and (4) depict the outcomes when 
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we instead use short-impact and humanitarian aid.17 As in Reddy and Minoiu (2006), all the 
columns show that neither the significance nor the size of the effects is essentially altered 
compared to their full sample counterparts suggesting the non-existence of income threshold 
effects.  
 
4   Theory 
In this section, we build a simple stochastic growth model, the results of which will provide a 
suggestive theoretical rationalisation for the results obtained in the empirical analysis of our 
paper. The model’s basic structure comprises an aid-recipient economy and a foreign donor 
(e.g., a country, a group of countries or an international organisation like the World Bank). 
There are two types of entities in the recipient economy – agents and a government. The 
engine of growth is the accumulation of – both private and public – physical capital. Private 
capital is accumulated by agents. Each period the government receives (random) foreign aid 
stipends which allocates between lump-sum income transfers to the private sector and – by 
combining them with revenues from taxation of domestic production – the formation of 
public capital.        
 
4.1   The Basic Framework 
Time is discrete, indexed by t  and measured from 0  (the initial period) to ∞ . We consider 
an artificial economy populated by a large number of identical, infinitely-lived producers-
consumers. For simplicity, population growth is assumed to be zero and, without loss of 
generality, the total population size is normalised to unity. At the beginning of lifetime, each 
agent is endowed with an initial level of private capital equal to 0 0k > , and the economy as 
a whole is endowed with an initial level of public capital equal to 0 0G > .   
   Agents receive utility by the consumption of privately produced goods, denoted by tc , 
according to 
 0
0
ln( )t t
t
U E β c
∞
=
= ∑ , [2] 
                                                 
17 Long-impact aid and its volatility have been dropped from the model due to growth effects that are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
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where 0E  is the conditional expectations operator and (0,1)β ∈  is the discount factor.18 
   At the beginning of a period, each individual is endowed with a production technology 
through which she produces ty  units of a commodity by combining her previously 
accumulated capital stock, denoted by tk , and publicly provided capital, denoted by tG , 
according to  
 1Ω ω ωt t ty k G
−= ,   Ω 0> , (0,1)ω∈ . [3] 
   The representative agent can augment her physical capital stock by utilising a technology 
through which privtI  units of time- t  output yield 1tk +  units of physical capital available for 
time- 1t +  production, according to 1 (1 )priv privt t tk I δ k+ = + − . Of course, the equilibrium 
level of private investment will be equal to the agent’s saving, therefore 
(1 ) Τprivt t t t tI τ y c= − + − , where tτ  is a proportional tax rate imposed by the government 
and Τt  is a lump-sum income transfer that the individual receives from the government. To 
ensure analytical solutions, we assume full depreciation of private capital, that is privδ =1. 
Therefore, the evolution of private capital is given by    
 1 (1 ) Τt t t t tk τ y c+ = − + − . [4] 
   The accumulation of publicly provided capital takes place according to 
1 (1 )
pub pub
t t tG I δ G+ = + − , where pubtI  denotes public investment. For reasons of tractability, 
we will postulate full depreciation of public capital ( 1pubδ = ) for the remaining analysis. As 
discussed earlier, the government can invest in public capital by combining domestic 
revenues and aid transfers by the donor, denoted by tF .
19 Given the above, the evolution of 
public capital takes the form    
 1t t t tG τ y F+ = + . [5] 
                                                 
18 Logarithmic preferences for consumption are essential for the derivation of closed-form solutions.   
19 Although we abscond from considerations of international borrowing mainly to keep the analysis tightly 
focused on capital investment decisions, this approach could be justified given evidence provided by Prati and 
Tressel (2006). They argue that the vast majority of aid recipient countries have accumulated very high levels of 
debt that severely restricts their capacity to borrow in international markets.    
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   We assume that each period a foreign donor provides an income transfer to the economy 
equal to tA , measured in units of domestic output. Following Chatterjee et al. (2003), it is 
further assumed that the government devotes a fraction (1 ) [0,1]ζ− ∈  of this aid inflow to 
the private sector of the economy in the form of lump-sum income transfers (non-productive 
aid) while the remaining fraction [0,1]ζ ∈  is used to enhance the accumulation of 
productive public capital (productive aid).20 Without any loss of generality, we will assume that 
revenues from income taxation are used exclusively for the production of public goods, 
while the only source for financing lump-sum transfers comes from foreign aid inflows.21 
Given these assumptions, we have 
 Τ (1 )t tζ A= − , [6] 
 t tF ζA= . [7] 
   Our focus is to examine the effects of foreign aid along an equilibrium path with 
sustainable long-run growth. The existence of such an equilibrium requires that total aid 
disbursements are measured in proportion to the recipient’s total income. Hence, following 
Chatterjee et al. (2003) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007), we assume that 
 .t t tA α y=  [8] 
   Our point of departure from other analyses is that, in order to introduce aid volatility, we 
assume that { } 0t tα ∞=  is a sequence of identically and independently distributed random 
variables. In order to maintain clarity, we specify a simple probability distribution whereby 
 { } { } 0.5,t tprob α α σ prob α α σ= − = = + =? ?  [9] 
where α?  is used as a measure of the average (or permanent) level of foreign aid inflows and 
σ  is an indicator of foreign aid volatility.22 We impose the restriction α σ≥?  to ensure that 
aid receipts are nonnegative.  
                                                 
20 The reality is that the allocation of aid may be the outcome of many and complex dimensions involving the 
politico-economic environment within the recipient country and the negotiation procedure between 
governments and donors. Although these are very important issues, their analysis goes beyond the scope of this 
paper. For this reason we choose not to model them explicitly. 
21 The reason for using this assumption is that our focus is solely on the composition of foreign aid receipts.        
22 We use α?  and σ  as measures for aid and aid volatility, respectively, as in equilibrium the long-run rate of 
output growth depends solely on the foreign aid-to-output ratio, tα , rather than on the actual level of aid 
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4.2   Dynamic General Equilibrium  
The general equilibrium in this economy can be obtained by combining the assumptions of 
the previous section together with the first order conditions associated with the 
maximisation problem of the individual and the transversality condition on private capital. 
 
Definition. Given the initial values 0 0, 0k G > , a dynamic, competitive equilibrium is a sequence of 
quantities { }1 1 0, , , , ,Τ , , ,t t t t t t t t t tc y τ A F α k G ∞+ + =  such that: 
(i) Given { }1 0, , ,Τ , ,t t t t t t tτ A F α G ∞+ = , the quantities { }1 0,t t tc k ∞+ =  solve the representative 
agent’s optimisation problem. 
(ii) The goods market clears every period, i.e., 1 1t t t t ty A c k G+ ++ = + +  0t∀ ≥ . 
(iii) The government’s budget constraint is satisfied every period, i.e., 1t t t tG τ y F+ = +  0t∀ ≥ . 
 
   The agent’s objective is to choose sequences for { } 0t tc ∞= and { }1 0t tk ∞+ =  as to maximise the 
expected value of her lifetime utility, given in [2], subject to sequences for [3] and [4]. When 
maximising her lifetime utility, the representative agent takes the sequences of { }1 0t tG ∞+ = , 
{ } 0Τt t∞= ,  { } 0t tF ∞=  and { } 0t tA ∞=  as given.  
   The first order conditions for the above problem are given as follows 
 1 ,t
t
λ
c
=  [10] 
 1 11 1 1 1Ω [ (1 ) ]
ω ω
t t t t t tλ βω E λ τ k G
− −
+ + + += − , [11] 
where tλ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with [4] and tE  is the conditional 
expectations operator. Equation [10] is the familiar condition equating the shadow value of 
wealth with the marginal utility of consumption. Equation [11] is the dynamic optimality 
                                                                                                                                                 
inflows, tA . The randomness in tα  is meant to capture the empirically observed fact that in many instances, 
the variability in foreign aid provision is higher than the variability of the recipient economy’s GDP (e.g., 
Pallage and Robe 2001).   
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condition, equating the marginal cost with the expected marginal benefit of an increment in 
private capital investment.  
   Multiplying both sides of equation [11] by 1tk +  and substituting equations [3] and [10] 
yields 
 1 1 1
1
(1 )t t t
t
t t
k τ yβωE
c c
+ + +
+
 −=   
. [12]  
Next we combine equations [4], [6] and [8] as to get   
 1
1 (1 )
t t
t
t t
c k
y
τ ζ α
++= − + − . [13] 
Now, substitute [13] in [12] to get 
 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
t t t t
t t
t t t t t t
k τ τ kβωE βωE
c τ ζ α τ ζ α c
+ + + +
+ + + + +
   − −= +   − + − − + −   
. [14] 
   Before we proceed with the solution of the model, we will utilise an assumption that will 
introduce a type of fiscal response by the government. Specifically, we assume that every 
period the government adjusts its policy as to keep the rate of public investment constant at  
 1t
t
G
g
y
+ = ,   1g < . [15] 
This assumption, can be combined together with [5], [7] and [8] to yield 
 t tτ g ζα= − , [16] 
where the additional restriction α σ g+ <?  ensures positive tax rates. Equation [16] implies 
that a rise in aid receipts, when used to co-finance public capital investment, allow the 
government to reduce the tax rate on the private sector’s income.23  
   Recall that, given [9], the sequence of random variables { } 0t tα ∞=  generate constant mean 
and variance. Given this and the transversality condition on capital, 
                                                 
23 In this respect, our assumption concerning the use of foreign aid disbursements resembles the observations 
made by Boone (1996) (see Footnote 2). There are other analyses that provide some justification for our 
approach. Using a dynamic theoretical model, Kimbrough (1986) has shown that the reduction of the tax rate 
in response to receiving productive aid is an optimising behavior by the government. There is also empirical 
evidence arguing that recipients’ tax revenues may respond negatively to the provision of aid (e.g., Leuthold 
1991).  
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1lim [ / ] 0
j
t t j t jj
β E k c+ + +→∞ = , we guess that the solution for 1 /t tk c+  is a constant, say J , t∀ . 
Therefore, we can use this together with  [16] in [14] and rewrite it as  
 Ψ ΨJ βω βω J= + , [17] 
where, from [9]  
 1
1
1 1 ( ) 1 ( )1Ψ 1
1 2 1 1
t
t
t
g ζα g ζ α σ g ζ α σ
E
g α g α σ g α σ
+
+
   − + − + − − + += = + ≤   − + − + − − + +  
? ?
? ? . [18] 
   The expression in [17] can be solved for 1 /t tJ k c+=  to yield  
 1
Ψ
1 Ψ
t
t
k βω
c βω
+ = − , [19] 
a solution that satisfies the transversality condition on capital and can be verified by direct 
substitution back in the stochastic difference equation displayed in [14]. 
   Our next step is to obtain the private saving rate. This can be done by substituting [6], [8], 
[16] and [19] in [4] and solving for 1tk + . Eventually, we get  
 1 Ψ(1 )t t t t tk βω g α y s y+ = − + = . [20] 
 
Proposition 1. A temporary rise (fall) in the provision of aid increases (decreases) private capital 
investment. 
 
Proof. From [20], it is obvious that / 0t ts α∂ ∂ > . ■  
 
   Intuitively, a temporary increase of foreign aid has two effects on physical capital 
investment. The fraction of aid used for public capital investment allows the government to 
reduce the income tax rate, thus leaving more available resources to individuals for both 
consumption and saving. This effect is reinforced by the fraction of aid used for transfer 
payments as it provides individuals with an additional source of income to consume and 
save.  
 
Proposition 2. A permanent rise (fall) in the provision of aid and a fall (rise) in its volatility decreases 
(increases) private capital investment, as long as some aid is allocated to lump-sum transfers. If the total 
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amount of aid is allocated to the formation of public capital, changes in both the permanent part and the 
volatility of aid have no effect on private capital investment. 
 
Proof.  This follows from [20], where we observe that / Ψ 0ts∂ ∂ > , and from [18], where it is 
easy to establish that Ψ/ 0α∂ ∂ <?  and Ψ/ 0σ∂ ∂ >  when 0 1ζ≤ < . Furthermore 
Ψ/ 0α∂ ∂ =?  and Ψ/ 0σ∂ ∂ =  when 1ζ = .  ■ 
 
   The rationale for these results is the following: Current investment decisions yield benefits 
in the future as they affect next period’s output, and therefore the expected utility from 
future consumption. The expectation of permanently higher aid (i.e., an increase in α? ) 
generates substitution and income effects with opposite impacts on private investment. On 
the one hand, it stimulates capital accumulation as individuals expect a future decrease in the 
tax rate, allowing them to substitute current for future consumption through saving. On the 
other hand, the expected future increase in disposable income and consumption (now, as a 
result of both the reduction in the tax rate and the available resources through income 
transfers) induces individuals to increase their current consumption by limiting the resources 
devoted for saving and, therefore, the accumulation of private capital. When 1ζ =  the two 
effects cancel each other out, but as long as 1ζ <  the second effect dominates. With respect 
to the effects of an increase in aid volatility (i.e., a higher σ ), what is crucial is the non-linear 
manner through which 1tα +  affects the expectation term in [18]. Inspection of this term 
reveals that it is convex in 1tα + . In terms of intuition, it shows that the increase in 
investment, resulting from an expected reduction in aid, is more pronounced than the 
decrease in investment, resulting from an expected raise in aid of equal magnitude. Aid 
volatility is a source of income uncertainty to which individuals react with a permanent 
precautionary increase of their capital investment.  
 
4.3   Trend Growth and the Allocation of Volatile Aid  
The economy’s growth rate can be obtained by utilising [15] and [20], substituting in [3], and 
dividing both sides of the resulting expression by 1ty − . Eventually, we get  
 ( ) 1 1
1
Ω Ψ (1 )ω ω ω ωt t
t
y βω g g α
y
−
−
−
= − + , [21] 
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where the solution for Ψ  is given in [18]. It is evident, from equation [21], that the growth 
rate will vary with different realisations of 1tα −  as a result of the response of private 
investment to temporary variations in foreign aid receipts. As this model includes a 
stochastic element, the actual (or temporary) growth rate becomes effectively a random 
variable with different realisations each period according to different realisations of 1tα − . To 
obtain the long-run, or trend, growth rate of output, γ? , we need to take account of the 
statistical properties of the distribution of 1tα − , given in [9], to compute its mean value. 
Taking expectations on [21] and using [9] yields 
 ( ) 1
1
Ω Ψ [(1 ) (1 ) ]
2
ω
ω ω ω ωt
t
y g
Mean βω g α σ g α σ γ
y
−
−
  = − + − + − + + ≡  
? ? ? . [22] 
   The growth rate in [22] together with [18] reveal that, ceteris paribus, the impact of a change 
in both the average (or permanent) level of aid inflows and in the degree of aid volatility 
depends crucially on the parameter ζ  which determines the allocation of foreign aid by the 
recipient economy, i.e., whether aid disbursements are distributed to agents in the form of 
income transfers or used to expand the accumulation of public capital. To make the 
argument more transparent, we can treat ζ  as a binary (or indicator) parameter and consider 
the two extremes in which either 1ζ =  (productive aid) or 0ζ =  (non-productive aid). 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that foreign aid receipts are used purely for public capital investment. Then a 
permanent increase (decrease) in aid and a decrease (increase) in its volatility enhances (impedes) trend growth 
for the recipient economy. 
 
Proof. From [18] check that when 1ζ =  then Ψ 1= . After substitution of this in [22] it is 
straightforward to show that / 0γ α∂ ∂ >? ?  and / 0γ σ∂ ∂ <? .  ■ 
 
   Recall that in Propositions 1 and 2 we established that when 1ζ =  only temporary 
variations in foreign aid impinge on the agents’ saving rate. Consequently, this is the only 
channel through which the effects of aid impinge on trend growth. The production 
technology, for a given level of public capital, exhibits a diminishing marginal product of 
private capital. Together with [20], this explains the concavity of the temporary growth rate 
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with respect to 1tα − . The temporary rise in growth resulting from a temporary increase in 
foreign aid is not as strong as the temporary reduction in growth resulting from a decrease in 
foreign aid of equal magnitude. Consequently, aid volatility (i.e., σ ) leaves the growth rate 
lower on average. Naturally, trend growth responds positively to the permanent part of 
foreign aid (i.e., α? ) as this corresponds to a permanent increase in private investment (due to 
the lower tax rate) when 1ζ = .   
 
Proposition 4. Suppose that foreign aid receipts are used purely for the distribution of lump-sum transfers 
to the private sector. Then a permanent increase (decrease) in aid and a decrease (increase) in its volatility 
impedes (enhances) trend growth for the recipient economy. 
 
Proof. Substituting 0ζ =  in [18] yields 2 2(1 )(1 )Ψ (1 )
g g α
g α σ
− − += − + −
?
? . Given this, the growth rate in 
[22] equals 
 ( ) 1 1 1Ω [(1 )(1 )]
2 1 1
ω ωω
ω ωgγ βω g g α
g α σ g α σ
−     = − − +  +    − + − − + +     
? ? ? ? . 
Some further algebra reveals that / 0γ α∂ ∂ <? ?  and / 0γ σ∂ ∂ >? .  ■ 
 
   When aid receipts are used for the provision of transfer payments to the private sector, 
there are two channels through which α?  and σ  transmit their effects on long-run growth. 
One channel comes through the presence of 1tα −  in the growth equation, reflecting the 
increase in saving due to the higher disposable income. The corresponding growth effects of 
foreign aid are similar to that described in the analysis of Proposition 3. The other channel 
comes through the effects that the permanent component of aid and its volatility have on 
private capital investment (and, consequently, trend growth) when a only a fraction of aid 
receipts contributes to the accumulation of public capital. As we recall from Proposition 2, 
private capital investment (under such circumstances) is negatively related with α?  and 
positively related with σ  - effects which are transmitted to long-run growth through private 
capital accumulation. As it turns out, these effects actually dominate in magnitude when 
0ζ = . 
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4.4   Aid Volatility and Effectiveness 
   So far, our dynamic general equilibrium model has been able to provide an intuitive 
rationale behind the results of the econometric analysis that illustrated how the effects of 
volatile aid on economic growth can be classified in relation to the allocation of aid transfers 
between productive and non-productive uses.      
   Moreover, our theoretical model is able to reproduce and explain an even more important 
insight which emerged from our econometric study. This has to do with the fact that the 
mere presence of volatility in aid disbursements adds a further dimension on the foreign aid-
economic growth nexus. To illustrate this, let us first see how foreign aid affects growth in 
the absence of volatility.  
 
Proposition 5. Suppose that foreign aid is not volatile. Then a permanent increase (decrease) in aid 
enhances (impedes) trend growth for the recipient economy, as long as some aid is allocated to the formation of 
public capital. If the whole amount of aid is allocated to the provision of lump-sum transfers, any change in 
foreign aid has no effect on trend growth.  
 
Proof.  Set 0σ =  in [18] and [22]. Then it can be established that / 0γ α∂ ∂ >? ?  when 0ζ >  
and / 0γ α∂ ∂ =? ?  when 0ζ = .  ■ 
 
The intuition for this result can be explained once we recall that the channel through which 
foreign aid impinges on growth is its effect on private investment – either because it allows a 
reduction in the tax rate when it partially finances public capital investment or because it 
gives an additional source of income when distributed as a transfer. Now, let us revisit 
equations [18] and [20], but setting tα α= ?  since 0σ = . We can see that in the deterministic 
case, the temporary effect that creates a wedge between current and anticipated future events 
– something crucial in the stochastic model – is absent. When 0ζ =  the increase in saving 
due to more resources is counter-balanced by the decrease in saving generated from the 
income effect. As long as 0ζ > , the substitution effect from the reduced tax rate kicks in 
and the positive growth effect of aid is always dominant. Hence, foreign aid results in a 
boost of capital accumulation and, therefore, growth.24 
                                                 
24 Recall that these findings were empirically illustrated in Table 3, column (7) and Table 5, column (5). 
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   The preceding analysis, when contrasted with the analysis of the stochastic model, 
introduces an important consideration which is summarised below. 
 
Corollary. The effect of foreign aid on the recipient’s growth rate may be negative if and only if aid is 
volatile.  
 
This result can be deduced from the discussion of Propositions 4 and 5. When a large part of 
foreign aid is allocated to activities that are not directly productive or are even non-
productive – in our case, lump-sum transfer payments – then whether aid is volatile or not 
may actually determine whether it inhibits or promotes the growth prospect of the recipient 
economy. Indeed, our discussion of Propositions 3 and 4 implied that there exists some 
critical threshold of aid allocation (as described by ζ ), below which foreign aid has, on 
average, a negative effect on growth. Now, we see that it is not the allocation rule per se that 
may render aid detrimental for long-run growth. Instead, there are situations where below 
such thresholds, aid may still promote growth but only if it is not volatile. As a consequence, 
the results of the empirical analysis (documented by the outcome of the Wald test in Table 
2) find a clear interpretation: It is the allocation of volatile aid flows that is important in 
determining whether these flows alter the growth performance of the recipients for better or 
for worse. 
 
5   Conclusions 
The objective of this paper has been to evaluate the relationship between foreign aid and 
economic growth. Our contribution lies on identifying, both theoretically and empirically, the 
volatility of aid flows – documented by the studies of Pallage and Robe (2001) and Buliř and 
Hamann (2003, 2006) – as an additional factor on the determination of the growth effects 
generated by the provision of aid.  
   Specifically, we distinguish the effects of aid transfers and their volatility according to 
whether foreign resource inflows are utilised for financing productive or non-productive 
public spending. The general conclusion emerging from our analysis can be summarised as 
follows: When aid is used productively (unproductively) it has, on average, a positive (negative) 
effect on growth while its respective volatility has a negative (positive) growth effect. Even 
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more significant is our argument that scenarios in which aid can actually hurt trend output 
growth in the recipient arise only in cases where foreign aid is volatile.  
   From a policy perspective, our results seem to suggest that the scope for a higher 
effectiveness of aid on stimulating growth is not purely an one-sided issue. Undoubtedly, 
recipient governments have to ensure and establish the conditions that will allow the 
economy to benefit from the provision of foreign aid (e.g., through appropriate 
macroeconomic management, establishment of essential economic, political and legal 
institutions etc.). On their behalf, however, donors should act analogously by creating 
conditions which allow aid provision to benefit recipient economies on a more permanent 
basis. Our analysis suggests that one such condition is that productive aid provision should 
be the least erratic possible. 
   The need to keep our theory tractable and tightly focused means that our analysis, together 
with the previous studies on the foreign aid-economic growth nexus, shares a fair number of 
restrictions. One such restriction is that our analysis abstracts from the important issue of 
poverty reduction. Insofar as income transfers can alleviate, to some extent, the severely 
adverse effects resulting from situations of extreme poverty (i.e., high mortality rates, 
restrictions on undertaking costly activities that promote future productivity) then one can 
identify additional channels through which foreign aid and its volatility impinge on trend 
output growth. Another shortcoming is that we have considered the provision of aid and its 
distribution on different uses as exogenously given, without specifying any kind of 
preferences for either donors or recipients. To the extent that the inclusion of such 
preferences may result in strategic interactions in the decisions between donors and 
recipients, then the possibility of multiple equilibria may actually provide an explanation of 
why aid disbursements are volatile.  
   Although removing such restrictions will make the analysis richer – and for this reason it 
may constitute a promising avenue for future research – it is our belief that our framework, 
even in its current form, is sufficient to draw attention to some additional and important 
implications on the growth effects of foreign aid. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP p.c. growth rate  0.888 2.75 -8.65 7.35 
Gross aid 8.45 10.18 0.037 56.48 
Volatility of gross aid 3.22 5.23 0.012 30.24 
Productive aid 7.32 8.18 0.013 36.89 
Unproductive aid 1.13 4.70 0.0006 44.89 
Volatility of productive aid 2.83 3.75 0.012 17.69 
Volatility of unproductive aid 0.952 3.67 0.0003 33.01 
Short-impact aid 4.62 5.17 0.012 24.39 
Long-impact aid 2.71 3.40 0.002 18.03 
Humanitarian aid 1.13 4.70 0.0006 44.89 
Volatility of short-impact aid 2.32 2.85 0.013 18.18 
Volatility of long-impact aid 1.47 2.10 0.0018 12.23 
Volatility of humanitarian aid 0.952 3.67 0.0003 33.01 
Aid repayments (log) -0.967 1.33 -4.62 2.14 
Initial p.c. GDP (log) 6.83 1.03 4.60 8.98 
M2/GDP 37.08 37.48 8.36 346.90 
East Asia 0.082 0.276 0 1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.319 0.468 0 1 
Fertility rate 4.57 1.60 1.72 7.72 
Tropical  0.680 0.468 0 1 
Initial life expectancy (log) 4.07 0.164 3.69 4.32 
Notes: All variables are based on 9-year averages of the data. The variables gross aid, productive aid, 
unproductive aid, and M2 are expressed as fractions of GDP. The volatility of a variable is defined as 
its standard deviation. Initial GDP, aid repayments, and initial life expectancy enter in log form, while 
East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Tropical enter as 0/1 dummies. 
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Table 2 
Basic Findings 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
GMM 
(5) 
GMM-SYS 
Initial GDP per capita (log) 0.694 
(0.003) 
0.724 
(0.002) 
-0.266 
(0.347) 
-0.795 
(0.000) 
-0.040 
(0.959) 
Gross aid 0.098 
(0.054)     
Volatility of gross aid -0.314 
(0.002)     
Productive aid  0.166 (0.004) 
0.227 
(0.000) 
0.234 
(0.000) 
0.267 
(0.000) 
Unproductive aid  -0.444 (0.009) 
-0.882 
(0.000) 
-1.34 
(0.000) 
-1.27 
(0.000) 
Volatility of productive aid  -0.539 (0.000) 
-0.601 
(0.000) 
-0.746 
(0.000) 
-0.704 
(0.000) 
Volatility of unproductive aid  0.550 (0.019) 
0.941 
(0.000) 
1.25 
(0.001) 
1.33 
(0.001) 
Aid repayments (log) 0.216 
(0.232) 
0.277 
(0.122) 
0.350 
(0.076) 
-0.109 
(0.511) 
0.341 
(0.278) 
M2/GDP    0.026 (0.001) 
0.044 
(0.000) 
0.042 
(0.011) 
East Asia   2.30 (0.000) 
1.36 
(0.009) 
1.86 
(0.012) 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -0.615 (0.310) 
-0.156 
(0.731) 
-0.529 
(0.575) 
Fertility rate   -0.563 (0.029) 
-0.898 
(0.000) 
-0.589 
(0.046) 
Tropical   -0.551 (0.207) 
-0.294 
(0.399) 
-0.312 
(0.541) 
Initial life expectancy (log)   0.992 (0.728) 
-1.57 
(0.352) 
-0.425 
(0.925) 
Countries / Observations 66 / 172 66 / 172 63 / 166  54 / 105 63 / 166 
R2  0.205 0.243 0.527 0.552  
Number of Instruments - - - 28 43 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) - - - 0.341 0.192 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.0001 0.0002 0.868 0.061 0.001 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.123 0.164 0.957 - - 
One-sided Wald-test (p-value) 0.999 0.997 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered by country standard errors. Constant term and time 
dummies not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Instruments in regression (4): dummies for 
Central American countries, African Franc Zone countries, Egypt, and post-conflict 1 and post-conflict 2 
periods, lagged arms imports as a fraction of total imports, GDP per capita and its square, population and its 
square, infant mortality rate and its square, each of the lagged aid variables, the lagged volatility of the aid 
variables, and the lagged productive and unproductive aid variables interacted with population. Instruments in 
regression (5): one to three time lags of the endogenous variables. 
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Table 3 
Testing the specification: additional controls 
 (1) 
GMM 
(2) 
GMM 
(3) 
GMM 
(4) 
GMM 
(5) 
GMM 
(6) 
GMM 
(7) 
GMM 
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.935 
(0.000) 
-1.08 
(0.000) 
-0.905 
(0.000) 
-1.06 
(0.000) 
-0.573 
(0.001) 
-0.785 
(0.000) 
-0.914 
(0.000) 
Productive aid 0.203 
(0.003) 
0.274 
(0.000) 
0.215 
(0.001) 
0.258 
(0.018) 
0.294 
(0.000) 
0.215 
(0.000) 
0.078 
(0.028) 
Unproductive aid -1.15 
(0.001) 
-1.06 
(0.000) 
-1.34 
(0.000) 
-4.01 
(0.020) 
-1.93 
(0.024) 
-1.66 
(0.018) 
-0.052 
(0.775) 
Volatility of productive aid -0.683 
(0.000) 
-0.895 
(0.000) 
-0.674 
(0.000) 
-0.540 
(0.013) 
-0.635 
(0.000) 
-0.442 
(0.001) 
 
Volatility of unproductive aid 1.12 
(0.005) 
1.15 
(0.001) 
1.28 
(0.001) 
3.79 
(0.022) 
2.15 
(0.015) 
1.69 
(0.031) 
 
Aid repayments (log) 0.011 
(0.953) 
-0.180 
(0.169) 
-0.097 
(0.613) 
-0.409 
(0.044) 
-0.374 
(0.004) 
-0.402 
(0.018) 
-0.584 
(0.001) 
M2/GDP  0.033 
(0.018) 
0.028 
(0.001) 
0.042 
(0.000) 
0.031 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.666) 
0.008 
(0.412) 
0.002 
(0.810) 
East Asia 1.60 
(0.002) 
1.72 
(0.000) 
1.53 
(0.011) 
1.30 
(0.030) 
1.24 
(0.000) 
1.06 
(0.005) 
1.13 
(0.015) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.185 
(0.710) 
0.036 
(0.944) 
0.04 
(0.992) 
-0.082 
(0.911) 
-1.94 
(0.000) 
-1.86 
(0.000) 
-0.971 
(0.057) 
Fertility rate -0.922 
(0.000) 
-0.808 
(0.000) 
-0.931 
(0.000) 
-1.38 
(0.000) 
-1.00 
(0.000) 
-0.864 
(0.000) 
-1.01 
(0.000) 
Tropical -0.380 
(0.316) 
-0.306 
(0.322) 
-0.364 
(0.346) 
-0.720 
(0.022) 
-0.982 
(0.000) 
-1.13 
(0.000) 
-1.33 
(0.000) 
Initial life expectancy (log) -0.509 
(0.732) 
2.14 
(0.232) 
-0.632 
(0.710) 
-4.48 
(0.175) 
-6.38 
(0.001) 
-6.58 
(0.000) 
-3.99 
(0.042) 
Initial secondary school 
enrollment ratio 
0.011 
(0.451)       
Land area  0.00141 (0.001)      
Black market premium   -0.0001 (0.462)     
Budget balance    0.198 
(0.003) 
   
Inflation     -1.95 (0.000) 
-2.03 
(0.000) 
-3.27 
(0.000) 
Openness (Sachs-Warner)     0.995 (0.017) 
1.32 
(0.010) 
1.39 
(0.035) 
Institutional quality     0.221 (0.010) 
0.407 
(0.002) 
0.274 
(0.088) 
Countries / Observations 53 / 102 53 / 103 53 / 102 41 / 72 43 / 82 40 / 75 40 / 75 
R2  0.593 0.579 0.576 0.719 0.783 0.808 0.769 
Number of Instruments 29 29 29 29 31 31 29 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.573 0.167 0.581 0.753 0.214 0.239 0.423 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.054 0.106 0.072 0.865 0.097 0.130 0.716 
AR(2) test (p-value) - - - - - - - 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered by country standard errors. Constant term and time dummies not reported. 
Instrumented variables are in bold type. Instruments in regressions (1)-(7): as in Table 2 regression (4). Regression (4) also adds as 
instrument the lagged budget balance, while regression (6) adds the lagged values of inflation, openness, and institutional quality. 
Additionally, regression (7) includes the lagged values of log(initial GDP pc) and M2/GDP. 
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Table 4  
Testing the time interval: alternative periodization 
 
(1) 
GMM 
9-year average 
(2) 
GMM 
4-year average 
(3) 
GMM-SYS 
9-year average 
(4) 
GMM-SYS 
4-year average 
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.795 
(0.000) 
-0.567 
(0.016) 
-0.040 
(0.959) 
0.130 
(0.855) 
Productive aid 0.234 
(0.000) 
0.166 
(0.006) 
0.267 
(0.000) 
0.159 
(0.039) 
Unproductive aid -1.34 
(0.000) 
-1.81 
(0.000) 
-1.27 
(0.000) 
-1.22 
(0.033) 
Volatility of productive aid -0.746 
(0.000) 
-0.578 
(0.001) 
-0.704 
(0.000) 
-0.431 
(0.019) 
Volatility of unproductive aid 1.25 
(0.001) 
2.55 
(0.000) 
1.33 
(0.001) 
1.84 
(0.007) 
Aid repayments (log) -0.109 
(0.511) 
0.122 
(0.590) 
0.341 
(0.278) 
0.148 
(0.604) 
M2/GDP  0.044 
(0.000) 
0.034 
(0.000) 
0.042 
(0.011) 
0.030 
(0.066) 
East Asia 1.36 
(0.009) 
0.974 
(0.103) 
1.86 
(0.012) 
1.25 
(0.216) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.156 
(0.731) 
-0.532 
(0.400) 
-0.529 
(0.575) 
-0.962 
(0.417) 
Fertility rate -0.898 
(0.000) 
-1.21 
(0.000) 
-0.589 
(0.046) 
-1.03 
(0.009) 
Tropical -0.294 
(0.399) 
-0.494 
(0.215) 
-0.312 
(0.541) 
-0.142 
(0.801) 
Initial life expectancy (log) -1.57 
(0.352) 
-2.65 
(0.333) 
-0.425 
(0.925) 
-4.31 
(0.528) 
Countries / Observations  54 / 105 62 / 304 63 / 166 65 / 370 
R2 0.552 0.264   
Number of Instruments 28 29 43 107 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.341 0.278 0.192 1.00 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.061 0.082 0.001 0.045 
AR(2) test (p-value) - 0.421 - 0.404 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered by country standard errors. Constant term and time dummies 
not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Columns (1) and (3) are reproductions of columns (4) and (5) of 
Table 2 respectively. Instruments in regressions (2) and (4): as in regressions (1) and (3) respectively. 
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Table 5 
Testing the proxy of productive aid: a more detailed disaggregation 
 (1) 
GMM 
(2) 
GMM 
(3) 
GMM 
(4) 
GMM 
(5) 
GMM 
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.918 
(0.000) 
-1.06 
(0.000) 
-0.903 
(0.000) 
-0.765 
(0.001) 
-0.945 
(0.000) 
Short-impact aid 0.361 
(0.003) 
0.388 
(0.000) 
0.485 
(0.000) 
0.272 
(0.002) 
0.191 
(0.003) 
Long-impact aid 0.128 
(0.290) 
 
-0.077 
(0.617) 
  
Humanitarian aid -1.41 
(0.000) 
-1.62 
(0.000) 
-1.51 
(0.024) 
-2.35 
(0.000) 
-0.140 
(0.504) 
Volatility of short-impact aid -0.936 
(0.000) 
-1.10 
(0.000) 
-0.341 
(0.022) 
-0.391 
(0.023) 
 
Volatility of long-impact aid -0.277 
(0.074) 
 
-0.319 
(0.263) 
  
Volatility of humanitarian aid 1.41 
(0.003) 
1.56 
(0.005) 
1.38 
(0.068) 
2.38 
(0.001) 
 
Aid repayments (log) -0.078 
(0.615) 
-0.126 
(0.445) 
-0.645 
(0.000) 
-0.544 
(0.001) 
-0.672 
(0.000) 
M2/GDP  0.050 
(0.000) 
0.064 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.723) 
0.013 
(0.125) 
0.0004 
(0.962) 
East Asia 1.27 
(0.059) 
0.896 
(0.230) 
1.08 
(0.012) 
0.628 
(0.119) 
1.20 
(0.010) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.498 
(0.198) 
0.735 
(0.079) 
-2.10 
(0.000) 
-1.60 
(0.001) 
-1.02 
(0.042) 
Fertility rate -0.832 
(0.000) 
-0.845 
(0.000) 
-0.828 
(0.000) 
-0.918 
(0.000) 
-1.03 
(0.000) 
Tropical -0.427 
(0.228) 
-0.221 
(0.514) 
-0.803 
(0.000) 
-1.06 
(0.000) 
-1.34 
(0.000) 
Initial life expectancy (log) 1.28 
(0.559) 
0.971 
(0.610) 
-3.71 
(0.067) 
-7.10 
(0.000) 
-3.20 
(0.092) 
Inflation   -2.38 
(0.000) 
-2.44 
(0.000) 
-3.40 
(0.000) 
Openness (Sachs-Warner)   1.17 
(0.012) 
1.74 
(0.000) 
1.37 
(0.048) 
Institutional quality   0.237 
(0.079) 
0.282 
(0.043) 
0.203 
(0.195) 
Countries / Observations 54 / 103 54 / 103 40 / 74 40 / 74 40 / 75 
R2  0.528 0.435 0.795 0.797 0.756 
Number of Instruments 31 29 34 32 29 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.578 0.546 0.230 0.374 0.471 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.140 0.188 0.202 0.638 0.737 
AR(2) test (p-value) - - - - - 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered by country standard errors. Constant term and time 
dummies not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Instruments in regressions (1)-(5): as in Table 2 
regression (4). Regressions (3)-(5) also add as instruments the lagged values of inflation, openness, institutional 
quality, log(initial GDP pc), and M2/GDP. 
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Table 6 
Testing sub-samples: income threshold effects 
 (1) 
GMM 
(2) 
GMM-SYS 
(3) 
GMM 
(4) 
GMM-SYS 
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.377 
(0.107) 
0.768 
(0.558) 
-1.33 
(0.000) 
-1.28 
(0.170) 
Productive aid 0.288 
(0.000) 
0.260 
(0.000) 
  
Unproductive aid -1.88 
(0.000) 
-1.11 
(0.011) 
  
Volatility of productive aid -0.894 
(0.000) 
-0.663 
(0.000) 
  
Volatility of unproductive aid 1.79 
(0.000) 
1.20 
(0.011) 
  
Aid repayments (log) -0.377 
(0.107) 
0.679 
(0.043) 
-0.185 
(0.406) 
0.369 
(0.169) 
Short-impact aid 
  
0.430 
(0.000) 
0.224 
(0.002) 
Humanitarian aid 
  
-2.37 
(0.000) 
-0.574 
(0.034) 
Volatility of short-impact aid 
  
-1.26 
(0.000) 
-0.503 
(0.008) 
Volatility of humanitarian aid 
  
2.24 
(0.000) 
0.550 
(0.041) 
M2/GDP  0.067 
(0.000) 
0.033 
(0.075) 
0.099 
(0.000) 
0.021 
(0.192) 
East Asia 0.593 
(0.347) 
2.09 
(0.042) 
-0.398 
(0.640) 
2.21 
(0.001) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.376 
(0.407) 
-1.24 
(0.212) 
0.883 
(0.104) 
-0.313 
(0.784) 
Fertility rate -0.746 
(0.000) 
-0.547 
(0.100) 
-0.686 
(0.000) 
-0.395 
(0.131) 
Tropical 0.565 
(0.741) 
-0.592 
(0.365) 
1.17 
(0.006) 
-0.487 
(0.575) 
Initial life expectancy (log) -2.69 
(0.104) 
-3.97 
(0.561) 
1.21 
(0.519) 
6.11 
(0.167) 
Countries / Observations  42 / 82 46 / 125 42 / 82 46 / 125 
R2 0.352  0.126  
Number of Instruments 28 43 29 43 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.753 0.311 0.468 0.329 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.099 0.002 0.239 0.001 
AR(2) test (p-value) - - - - 
Notes: p-values in parentheses based on robust and clustered by country standard errors. Constant term and time 
dummies not reported. Instrumented variables are in bold type. Instruments in regressions (1)-(4): as in Table 2 
regression (4). Instruments in regressions (2) and (4): one to three time lags of the endogenous variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36
Country and Data Appendix  
 
Country Sample (66) 
Argentina, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Cyprus, Dominican Rep., Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran,  Israel, Korea Rep., Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, 
Suriname, Syrian Arab Rep., Tanzania,  Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Yemen Rep., Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Table A1 
Classification of Aid Flows 
Productive aid “P” Unproductive aid “U” 
Short-impact “S” Long-impact “L” Humanitarian “H” 
152 Conflict, Peace and Security 110 Education 520 Developmental Food Aid/ 
Food Security Assistance 
210 Transport and Storage 120 Health 710 Emergency Food Aid 
220 Communications 130 Population Policies/Programmes  
and Reproductive Health 
720 Other Emergency and  
Distress Relief 
230 Energy Generation and Supply 140 Water Supply and Sanitation 730 Reconstruction Relief 
240 Banking and Financial Services  151 Government and Civil Society  
250 Business and Other Services 160 Other Social Infrastructure and Services  
311 Agriculture 323 Construction  
312 Forestry 332 Tourism  
313 Fishing 410 General Environmental Protection  
321 Industry 420 Women in Development  
322 Mining and Mineral Resources 430 Other Multisectoral   
331 Trade Policy and Regulations 920 Support to NGO’s  
510 General Budget Support 998 Unallocated/Unclassified  
530 Other General Programme and e
Commodity Assistance 
  
600 Action Relating to Debt   
Note: the classification of aid into productive/unproductive and into short-impact/long-impact/humanitarian follows Clemens et al. (2004) 
at the three-digit level based on the OECD’s CRS. 
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Table A2 
Variables Description and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Basic Set 
Productive and 
unproductive aid 
“Productive” aid is the product across all donors, 
for each recipient, of “Total ODA (OA) Gross 
Disbursements” from the online DAC database, 
Table 2a, with the elements of the CRS field 
“usd_amount” classified as “P” in Table A1, 
divided by the sum of all aid in CRS field “Total 
ODA (OA) Commitments”, multiplied by 100. 
“Unproductive” aid is calculated in a similar way, 
according to the “U” classification in Table A1 (% 
of GDP in current USD from WDI (2003)). 
OECD, DAC (online) and 
CRS (online) based on 
Clemens et al. (2004) 
Volatility of productive 
(unproductive) aid 
Standard deviation of productive (unproductive) 
aid flows. 
OECD, DAC (online) and 
CRS (online)  
Short-impact, Long-impact, 
and Humanitarian aid 
Calculations similar to the categories of  “P” and 
“U” aid, but now according to the “S”, “L”, and 
“H” classifications in Table A1. 
OECD, DAC (online) and 
CRS (online) based on 
Clemens et al. (2004) 
Volatility of short-impact 
(long-impact) 
[humanitarian] aid 
Standard deviation of short-impact (long-impact) 
[humanitarian] aid flows. 
OECD, DAC (online) and 
CRS (online)  
Gross aid Official development assistance and gross official 
aid (% of GDP in current USD from WDI (2003)). 
OECD, DAC CD-ROM 
(2003) 
Volatility of gross aid Standard deviation of gross aid flows. OECD, DAC (2003) 
Aid repayments “Total ODA (OA) Gross” minus “Total ODA 
(OA) Net” from the DAC CD-ROM (2003) and 
DAC online, respectively (% of GDP in current 
USD from WDI (2003)). 
OECD, DAC CD-ROM 
(2003 and online) and WDI 
(2003) 
GDP p.c. growth rate Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita 
based on constant local currency. 
World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Initial p.c. GDP GDP per capita in constant 1995 USD for the first 
year of the period. 
World Bank, WDI (2003) 
M2/GDP Money and quasi money (% of GDP in current 
USD from WDI (2003)). 
World Bank, WDI (2003) 
East Asia Dummy indicating region. World Bank  
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy indicating region. World Bank  
Fertility rate Fertility rate (births per woman), total. World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Tropical  Dummy indicating tropical location. World Bank, Global 
Development Network  
Initial life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, total. World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Instruments Set 
Central America Dummy for Central American countries. World Bank 
Franc Zone Dummy for African Franc Zone countries. World Bank 
Egypt Dummy for Egypt.  
Post-conflict1 (Post-
conflict2) 
Dummy that takes the value of 1 one (two) 
period(s) after civil war has ended. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
Lagged arms imports Lagged arms imports as a fraction of total imports. Roodman (2004) 
Population Population, total. World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Infant mortality rate Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Sensitivity Set 
Initial secondary school 
enrollment ratio 
Gross ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to 
the population of the secondary school age group, 
for the first year of the period. 
World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Land area Kilometers. World Bank, Global 
Development Network 
Black market premium  World Bank, WDI (2003) 
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Budget balance Overall budget balance, including grants (% of 
GDP in current USD from WDI (2003)). 
World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Inflation Natural logarithm of 1+consumer price inflation 
rate. 
World Bank, WDI (2003) 
Openness (Sachs-Warner) Dummy variable that measures the degree of 
openness. 
Roodman (2004) 
Institutional quality ICRGE indicator: average of corruption, 
bureaucratic quality and rule of law indicators that 
take values between 0 and 10. 
Roodman (2004) 
Low-income countries Dummy that takes the value 1 for low-income and 
low-middle-income countries. 
World Bank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
